Decrypt Namespace Secret
Requirements
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For ALL tamper proofed hardware used in the ceremony, both operators MUST print photographic evidence from digital cameras which is stored in a PGP signed repository. The photographs should be of the top and underside of the vacuum sealed object.
- The operators should verify the commit signatures of the photographs they are printing against a list of permitted PGP keys found in the "ceremonies" repo
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- Provided by Air-Gapped Bundle
- Alternative: Create your own from documentation in AirgapOS Repository
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AirgapOS Laptop
- Provided by Air-Gapped Bundle
- Alternative: Computer that can load AirgapOS (compatibility reference)
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Minimum of 1 Operator and 1 Witness
- Personal PGP key pair for each operator
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Tamper-proofing equipment
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High Visibility Storage: plastic container or bag that's used to keep items while not in use in a visible location like the middle of a desk.
Procedure
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Enter the designated location with required personnel and equipment
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Lock access to the location - there should be no inflow or outflow of people during the ceremony
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Retrieve Air-Gapped Bundle and polaroid tamper evidence from locked storage
a. Retrieve digital/physical photographs of both sides of sealed bundle
b. Compare all photographs to object for differences
c. Proceed with unsealing the object if no differences are detected
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Place all materials except for the laptop into High Visibility Storage
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Retrieve AirgapOS SD card from High Visibility Storage and plug it into air-gapped laptop
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Turn on the machine
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Once booted, remove the AirgapOS SD card and place it into High Visibility Storage
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Retrieve Ceremony SD Card from High Visibility Storage and plug it into the machine
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Copy the Ceremony SD Card contents to machine
cp -r /media/vaults /root/
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Start
keyfork
using the relevant Shardfile:$ keyfork recover shard --daemon /root/vaults/<namespace>/shardfile.asc
- Follow on screen prompts
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Derive the OpenPGP root certificate:
$ keyfork derive openpgp > secret_key.asc
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Decrypt the secret material:
sq decrypt --recipient-file secret_key.asc < encrypted.asc --output decrypted
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Proceed to transfer the secret (
decrypted
) to desired location such as hardware wallet, power washed chromebook (via SD card) etc. -
Shut down the air gapped machine
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Gather all the original items that were in the air-gapped bundle:
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Air-gapped computer
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AirgapOS SD card
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Insert object(s) into plastic sealing bag
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Fill bag with enough plastic beads that most of the object is surrounded
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Use vacuum sealer to remove air from the bag until the beads are no longer able to move
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Take photographs of both sides of the sealed object using both the digital and polaroid camera
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Date and sign the polaroid photographs and store them in a local lock box
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Take the SD card to an online connected device, ensuring continued dual custody, and commit the tamper evidence photographs to a repository. If two individuals are present, have one create a PR with a signed commit, and the other do a signed merge commit.